04.02.2026 (Caucasian Journal) Today’s guest is Samvel MELIKSETYAN, a political analyst and expert at the Armenian Council (formerly Research Center on Security Policy, RCSP) in Yerevan, specializing in South Caucasus affairs. His work focuses on regional connectivity and the historical, demographic, and ethnic dimensions of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict.Samvel has been directly involved in recent Peace Bridge Initiative roundtables held in both Baku and Yerevan, giving him a rare, firsthand perspective on current civil dialogue efforts at a time of profound uncertainty in the region. (For the Azerbaijani perspective, please see our recent interview here)
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Dear Samvel, welcome to Caucasian Journal! You recently took part in Peace Bridge Initiative roundtables in both Baku and Yerevan. How did these meetings feel—both as an expert, and on a personal level?
Another emotional dimension is linked to the public reaction to these visits in Armenia and Azerbaijan. While meetings held in third countries were usually met with little attention from the media, experts, and civil society activists, direct visits generated broad interest and resonance in the media, including sharply critical coverage. On the one hand, this created a certain degree of pressure; on the other, it heightened the sense of responsibility and personal motivation to participate in an unpopular format, whose success also becomes, in part, a personal matter. I believe that without faith in success and a genuine desire to contribute, to the extent possible, to the normalization of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations and to closing decades of hostility, participation in this initiative would make little sense.
SM: What is different is precisely the context of these meetings and the understanding that these dialogues are not limited to expert discussions and may lead to practical changes. Moreover, they also reflect the readiness and willingness of the governments of both countries—after the failure of a number of previous initiatives and a long period of almost total absence of contacts between the societies—to move toward normalization of relations by gradually allowing the development of such initiatives.
AK: Civil dialogue is often praised as essential, but also criticized as having limited real-world impact. From your experience, do expert and civil contacts actually influence policy-making?
SM: This practical component is one of the key distinguishing features of the current process. Of course, the main changes take place at the official level, but discussions in these formats allow ideas to be generated more freely, and some of these ideas, at the very least, find understanding and resonance at the official level.
AK: Looking back at the roundtables, what were the three most important—or perhaps most unexpected—issues that emerged from the discussions?
SM: The main problems stemmed from the format itself and were linked to developments outside the format, above all to reactions in the media and expert discussions. These generated their own agenda and high expectations of the format, tying its effectiveness to the resolution of the most sensitive issues in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations—such as the release of Armenians detained in Baku, the acceleration of border delimitation and demarcation, and others—which are not directly related to this format.
AK: One of your key research areas is the unblocking of regional communications, including the possible opening of the Armenian–Turkish border. Are these projects today mainly technical and economic—or are they still fundamentally political?
SM: The decision to open the Armenian–Turkish border is a political one. At this stage, it is directly linked to a similar process in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations. However, once the borders are opened, a range of technical and economic issues will emerge that will need to be addressed. Technical matters include the restoration of the Kars–Gyumri railway and the creation of a terminal for transferring cargo from European-gauge wagons (1435 mm), commonly used in Turkey, to the Russian gauge (1520 mm), which is standard in Armenia and across the South Caucasus. Technical and economic challenges also include the rehabilitation of railway communications within Armenia that ceased to function during the conflict.
Among these is the Fioletovo–Ijevan–Gazakh railway, which could provide the shortest connection between Yerevan and Baku and, in the longer term—if a short Fioletovo–Vanadzor section (approximately 30 km) is built—it could create the shortest railway link between Turkey and Azerbaijan via Armenian territory and in entire South Caucasus (around 120 km shorter than TRIPP).
There are also other political problems, including those related to Russia’s concession over Armenia’s railways. During the years of the concession, parts of Armenia’s railway network that could have been used in the unblocking of communications lost functionality, such as the Meghradzor–Dilijan line. Violations amounting to more than $60 million, along with other breaches of concession terms, were identified during an audit in 2018–2019; however, under pressure from the Russian side, criminal cases were closed in March 2021 following Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War.
In addition, under the concession agreement, once borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are opened, the Russian company is obligated to invest more than $1 billion in the development of Armenia’s railways. Yet given the difficulties facing the parent company of South Caucasus Railways—Russian Railways—such investments are currently impossible. According to the concession agreement, this could constitute grounds for terminating the concession. However, in such cases the Russian side tends to employ mechanisms of political coercion and pressure, creating serious risks for Armenia and leaving the development of its railway communications in a state of prolonged uncertainty.
AK: How realistic is progress on Armenian–Turkish communications in the current environment? Can this track move independently of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations?
SM: If we are speaking about the full opening of borders, this process is linked to Armenian–Azerbaijani normalization and the signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Progress in Armenian–Azerbaijani normalization is already quite noticeable and could accelerate further after Armenia’s parliamentary elections, in parallel influencing the Armenian–Turkish track.
However, it is reasonable to assume that a partial opening of the Armenian–Turkish border may take place before that, for example in line with the 2022 decisions of the joint normalization commission to open the border for third-country nationals or holders of diplomatic passports. An even more important step could be the opening of cargo transit. Armenia already has a fairly significant trade turnover with Turkey (around $320 million), which currently relies on Turkish goods being delivered via Georgian territory by Turkish trucks that already travel freely within Armenia. Opening direct connectivity could substantially reduce the transaction costs of this trade.
AK: Border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains extremely sensitive. What, in your view, needs to be improved in the current approaches on each side—and what practical advice would you offer?
SM: I formulated my recommendations on border delimitation and demarcation in April 2024, when the first stage of this process between the two countries was underway. The decisions that were ultimately adopted were quite close to my proposals. An important step was also the adoption of the regulation on border delimitation and demarcation at the end of August 2024, which incorporates OSCE recommendations on this issue and introduces a fairly flexible model that, given sufficient political will, can enable more effective solutions to the problems faced by border communities and other issues related to the boundary between the two countries.
In my view, the most important principle should be that the decisions taken are as depoliticized as possible, while taking into account the interests of border populations and ensuring conditions for a comfortable livelihood in border areas. I also believe they should simplify the complex geography, contours, and structure of the Armenian–Azerbaijani border—one of the longest in Europe (over 1,000 km)—particularly with regard to cross-border communications, enclaves, and similar features created during the Soviet period, in part to generate conflict-prone zones and complicate any potential exit of the republics from the USSR.
At the same time, active state support for hostility-reinforcing historical narratives elevated the status of historians or pseudo-historians involved in this process. Because the conflict remains unresolved, this instrument continues to be practically relevant, enjoying either official sanction or the backing of certain influential circles.
In addition, the historicization of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict and its portrayal as something inherent or inevitable are characteristic of official Russian rhetoric and politicized Russian/Soviet historiography. This creates a niche for the empire as a mediator, presenting it as the sole arbiter, civilizer, and “reliable” guarantor of peaceful coexistence between two peoples who are depicted as otherwise doomed to repeat endless cycles of conflict without imperial oversight.
Today, propaganda built on this logic is also disseminated by various Russian outlets and individuals affiliated with Russian propaganda, serving as a legitimate tool to justify Russian hegemony in the region.
For this reason, I believe that the current period in the history of the South Caucasus can, in part, be compared to 1920—on the eve of Sovietization—when the inability of regional elites to resolve interstate conflicts made all three countries easy targets for the Bolsheviks, who instrumentalized ethnic conflicts to legitimize their intervention. I see the present era as a test of maturity for the elites of Armenia and Azerbaijan, to ensure that the events of a century ago are not repeated.
AK: Finally, if you could offer one (or more!) piece of advice to policymakers on all sides today, drawing on both your expertise and recent dialogue experience, what would it be?
SM: It seems to me that the most important thing is to make political decisions not on the basis of conflict-driven identities and entrenched mistrust—which often push actors toward zero-sum logic—but rather on the basis of how these decisions might improve the entire region over the next 10, 20, or 30 years. I believe that Armenian and Azerbaijani elites now stand before a choice that, for the first time in many decades, could steer the history of the entire South Caucasus toward regional integration, sustainable development, and peace for new generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This is a historic mission, and it represents something fundamentally new. All the bad decisions that could be made were made in the past, and they led to a severe catastrophe for both countries and peoples.
AK: Are there any additional insights or perspectives you'd like to share with our readers?
SM: No, but once again, thank you for the invitation and for this interesting format. I hope CJ readers will find in these reflections some thoughts and ideas of interest to them.
Samvel MELIKSETYAN: Hello, and thank you for the invitation! Over the past three decades, Armenian–Azerbaijani meetings at the level of experts, media representatives, and other civil society sectors, supported by various international peace initiatives and organizations, have taken place mainly in Georgia or European countries. Therefore, the format itself was not unfamiliar, and almost everyone in the groups already knew some participants from previous initiatives.
What is truly different this time is the location of the meetings — Yerevan and Baku — and the presence of official support. I think that for each side, visiting the other capital came with mixed emotions: from curiosity and interest to anxiety, along with many reflections on why the conflict between the sides evolved the way it did, as well as surprise at realizing that despite the long-standing conflict, both societies remain similar in many respects — cuisine, clothing and appearance, behavioral patterns, urban leisure, and more.
Another emotional dimension is linked to the public reaction to these visits in Armenia and Azerbaijan. While meetings held in third countries were usually met with little attention from the media, experts, and civil society activists, direct visits generated broad interest and resonance in the media, including sharply critical coverage. On the one hand, this created a certain degree of pressure; on the other, it heightened the sense of responsibility and personal motivation to participate in an unpopular format, whose success also becomes, in part, a personal matter. I believe that without faith in success and a genuine desire to contribute, to the extent possible, to the normalization of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations and to closing decades of hostility, participation in this initiative would make little sense.
The most important difference from previous initiatives is more practical orientation. The proposals emerging from these meetings may become elements of tangible change in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan across various fields.
From an expert perspective, I think the most important difference compared to all previous initiatives is the more practically oriented nature of the discussions. The debates, ideas, and proposals emerging from these meetings may become elements of tangible change in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan across various fields — from communications and mutual trade to strengthening confidence-building measures between the sides.
AK: As someone who has followed Armenian–Azerbaijani relations for many years, did anything in these discussions surprise you or challenge your previous assumptions?
AK: As someone who has followed Armenian–Azerbaijani relations for many years, did anything in these discussions surprise you or challenge your previous assumptions?
SM: What is different is precisely the context of these meetings and the understanding that these dialogues are not limited to expert discussions and may lead to practical changes. Moreover, they also reflect the readiness and willingness of the governments of both countries—after the failure of a number of previous initiatives and a long period of almost total absence of contacts between the societies—to move toward normalization of relations by gradually allowing the development of such initiatives.
AK: Civil dialogue is often praised as essential, but also criticized as having limited real-world impact. From your experience, do expert and civil contacts actually influence policy-making?
SM: This practical component is one of the key distinguishing features of the current process. Of course, the main changes take place at the official level, but discussions in these formats allow ideas to be generated more freely, and some of these ideas, at the very least, find understanding and resonance at the official level.
AK: Looking back at the roundtables, what were the three most important—or perhaps most unexpected—issues that emerged from the discussions?
SM: The main problems stemmed from the format itself and were linked to developments outside the format, above all to reactions in the media and expert discussions. These generated their own agenda and high expectations of the format, tying its effectiveness to the resolution of the most sensitive issues in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations—such as the release of Armenians detained in Baku, the acceleration of border delimitation and demarcation, and others—which are not directly related to this format.
AK: What needs to change for dialogue initiatives like these to become more effective and to produce tangible outcomes?
SM: It seems to me that the format itself is still very young and requires time, during which there will inevitably be both effective and ineffective tracks and forms of interaction. One has to take into account the highly sensitive environment in which this process is unfolding—an environment that must be considered in both Armenia and Azerbaijan—the long legacy of the conflict, the specific features of the format itself, which depends on the official track, and other factors, including differences between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies and political systems. All of this imposes constraints, creates risks and challenges, and can significantly affect the process, including in negative ways. At the same time, none of this should lead to an a priori assumption that the format cannot develop or is doomed to fail.
What is happening is a form of learning, in which the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides are learning to interact with one another in a new political environment that, in my view, nonetheless creates more opportunities—including for such formats—than ever before.
SM: It seems to me that the format itself is still very young and requires time, during which there will inevitably be both effective and ineffective tracks and forms of interaction. One has to take into account the highly sensitive environment in which this process is unfolding—an environment that must be considered in both Armenia and Azerbaijan—the long legacy of the conflict, the specific features of the format itself, which depends on the official track, and other factors, including differences between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies and political systems. All of this imposes constraints, creates risks and challenges, and can significantly affect the process, including in negative ways. At the same time, none of this should lead to an a priori assumption that the format cannot develop or is doomed to fail.
What is happening is a form of learning, in which the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides are learning to interact with one another in a new political environment that, in my view, nonetheless creates more opportunities—including for such formats—than ever before.
If a short Fioletovo–Vanadzor section is built—it could create the shortest railway link between Turkey and Azerbaijan and entire South Caucasus (around 120 km shorter than TRIPP).
SM: The decision to open the Armenian–Turkish border is a political one. At this stage, it is directly linked to a similar process in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations. However, once the borders are opened, a range of technical and economic issues will emerge that will need to be addressed. Technical matters include the restoration of the Kars–Gyumri railway and the creation of a terminal for transferring cargo from European-gauge wagons (1435 mm), commonly used in Turkey, to the Russian gauge (1520 mm), which is standard in Armenia and across the South Caucasus. Technical and economic challenges also include the rehabilitation of railway communications within Armenia that ceased to function during the conflict.
Among these is the Fioletovo–Ijevan–Gazakh railway, which could provide the shortest connection between Yerevan and Baku and, in the longer term—if a short Fioletovo–Vanadzor section (approximately 30 km) is built—it could create the shortest railway link between Turkey and Azerbaijan via Armenian territory and in entire South Caucasus (around 120 km shorter than TRIPP).
There are also other political problems, including those related to Russia’s concession over Armenia’s railways. During the years of the concession, parts of Armenia’s railway network that could have been used in the unblocking of communications lost functionality, such as the Meghradzor–Dilijan line. Violations amounting to more than $60 million, along with other breaches of concession terms, were identified during an audit in 2018–2019; however, under pressure from the Russian side, criminal cases were closed in March 2021 following Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War.
In addition, under the concession agreement, once borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are opened, the Russian company is obligated to invest more than $1 billion in the development of Armenia’s railways. Yet given the difficulties facing the parent company of South Caucasus Railways—Russian Railways—such investments are currently impossible. According to the concession agreement, this could constitute grounds for terminating the concession. However, in such cases the Russian side tends to employ mechanisms of political coercion and pressure, creating serious risks for Armenia and leaving the development of its railway communications in a state of prolonged uncertainty.
AK: How realistic is progress on Armenian–Turkish communications in the current environment? Can this track move independently of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations?
The Armenian–Azerbaijani border is one of the longest in Europe – over 1,000 km.
However, it is reasonable to assume that a partial opening of the Armenian–Turkish border may take place before that, for example in line with the 2022 decisions of the joint normalization commission to open the border for third-country nationals or holders of diplomatic passports. An even more important step could be the opening of cargo transit. Armenia already has a fairly significant trade turnover with Turkey (around $320 million), which currently relies on Turkish goods being delivered via Georgian territory by Turkish trucks that already travel freely within Armenia. Opening direct connectivity could substantially reduce the transaction costs of this trade.
AK: Border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains extremely sensitive. What, in your view, needs to be improved in the current approaches on each side—and what practical advice would you offer?
SM: I formulated my recommendations on border delimitation and demarcation in April 2024, when the first stage of this process between the two countries was underway. The decisions that were ultimately adopted were quite close to my proposals. An important step was also the adoption of the regulation on border delimitation and demarcation at the end of August 2024, which incorporates OSCE recommendations on this issue and introduces a fairly flexible model that, given sufficient political will, can enable more effective solutions to the problems faced by border communities and other issues related to the boundary between the two countries.
In my view, the most important principle should be that the decisions taken are as depoliticized as possible, while taking into account the interests of border populations and ensuring conditions for a comfortable livelihood in border areas. I also believe they should simplify the complex geography, contours, and structure of the Armenian–Azerbaijani border—one of the longest in Europe (over 1,000 km)—particularly with regard to cross-border communications, enclaves, and similar features created during the Soviet period, in part to generate conflict-prone zones and complicate any potential exit of the republics from the USSR.
The role of historians in fueling the confrontation in the late 1980s was critical... Active state support for hostility-reinforcing historical narratives elevated the status of pseudo-historians.
AK: You also study the demographic and ethnic dimensions of the conflict since the 19th century. How strongly do historical narratives still shape today’s political debates? Is there a lesser-known historical episode that you believe resonates particularly with the present moment? Please share with us.
SM: Historical narratives have played a major role in shaping the contemporary Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, and the role of historians in fueling the confrontation in the late 1980s was critically important. To a large extent, this is a legacy of the Soviet tradition, in which historical scholarship was one of the key instruments for constructing political identity, and historians and historical texts received state sanction. Subsequently, the active use of historical narratives contributed to the dehumanization of the opposing side, the denial of its right to live in the region, and the legitimization of acts of vandalism and the destruction of cultural heritage associated with the other side, both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan.
Susceptibility to such arguments is also linked to the presence of multiple historical traumas on each side.
SM: Historical narratives have played a major role in shaping the contemporary Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, and the role of historians in fueling the confrontation in the late 1980s was critically important. To a large extent, this is a legacy of the Soviet tradition, in which historical scholarship was one of the key instruments for constructing political identity, and historians and historical texts received state sanction. Subsequently, the active use of historical narratives contributed to the dehumanization of the opposing side, the denial of its right to live in the region, and the legitimization of acts of vandalism and the destruction of cultural heritage associated with the other side, both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan.
Susceptibility to such arguments is also linked to the presence of multiple historical traumas on each side.
Portrayal of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict and as inherent or inevitable are characteristic of politicized Russian/Soviet historiography. This creates a niche for the empire as the sole arbiter, civilizer, and “reliable” guarantor of peaceful coexistence between two peoples who are depicted as otherwise doomed to repeat endless cycles of conflict without imperial oversight.
At the same time, active state support for hostility-reinforcing historical narratives elevated the status of historians or pseudo-historians involved in this process. Because the conflict remains unresolved, this instrument continues to be practically relevant, enjoying either official sanction or the backing of certain influential circles.
In addition, the historicization of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict and its portrayal as something inherent or inevitable are characteristic of official Russian rhetoric and politicized Russian/Soviet historiography. This creates a niche for the empire as a mediator, presenting it as the sole arbiter, civilizer, and “reliable” guarantor of peaceful coexistence between two peoples who are depicted as otherwise doomed to repeat endless cycles of conflict without imperial oversight.
Today, propaganda built on this logic is also disseminated by various Russian outlets and individuals affiliated with Russian propaganda, serving as a legitimate tool to justify Russian hegemony in the region.
For this reason, I believe that the current period in the history of the South Caucasus can, in part, be compared to 1920—on the eve of Sovietization—when the inability of regional elites to resolve interstate conflicts made all three countries easy targets for the Bolsheviks, who instrumentalized ethnic conflicts to legitimize their intervention. I see the present era as a test of maturity for the elites of Armenia and Azerbaijan, to ensure that the events of a century ago are not repeated.
Armenian and Azerbaijani elites now stand before a choice that, for the first time in many decades, could steer the history of the entire South Caucasus toward regional integration, sustainable development, and peace for new generations.
AK: Finally, if you could offer one (or more!) piece of advice to policymakers on all sides today, drawing on both your expertise and recent dialogue experience, what would it be?
SM: It seems to me that the most important thing is to make political decisions not on the basis of conflict-driven identities and entrenched mistrust—which often push actors toward zero-sum logic—but rather on the basis of how these decisions might improve the entire region over the next 10, 20, or 30 years. I believe that Armenian and Azerbaijani elites now stand before a choice that, for the first time in many decades, could steer the history of the entire South Caucasus toward regional integration, sustainable development, and peace for new generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This is a historic mission, and it represents something fundamentally new. All the bad decisions that could be made were made in the past, and they led to a severe catastrophe for both countries and peoples.
AK: Are there any additional insights or perspectives you'd like to share with our readers?
SM: No, but once again, thank you for the invitation and for this interesting format. I hope CJ readers will find in these reflections some thoughts and ideas of interest to them.
AK: Thank you very much! I hope you come again.
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