20.01.2026 (Caucasian Journal) Today, the Caucasian Journal welcomes Dr. Rusif HUSEYNOV, a distinguished Azerbaijani political analyst and the co-founder and CEO of the Baku-based think tank, the Topchubashov Center. He has first-hand knowledge of key developments not only in Baku but across all regional directions.
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Dear Rusif, welcome to Caucasian Journal! Let’s begin with what many observers consider the most remarkable development of the past months: the unprecedented thaw between Azerbaijani and Armenian civil societies. You took part in the recent forums in both Baku and Yerevan. What moments or impressions struck you most personally? What emotion or mood defined the atmosphere?
Rusif HUSEYNOV: Although Armenian and Azerbaijani experts—including myself—have been in regular contact for several years across various platforms facilitated by different organizations, this direct bilateral engagement represents a genuine breakthrough. I feel privileged to be part of this bilateral framework bringing together Armenian and Azerbaijani experts under the Peace Bridge initiative, within which participants made reciprocal visits to Yerevan and Baku in October and November.
You can imagine the astonishment of Armenian airport workers when a large aircraft bearing the name Azerbaijan touched down on the runway in Yerevan.
I am still full of emotion. The impressions from these conversations—and from my visit to Yerevan in particular—remain vivid. Some moments were especially striking. One occurred even before we disembarked: you can imagine the astonishment of Armenian airport workers when a large aircraft bearing the name Azerbaijan touched down on the runway in Yerevan. From our seats inside the plane, we quietly observed their reactions. That moment left a deep impression on us, the Azerbaijani participants.
We could anticipate some form of provocation—or at least a protest—around the hotel. None materialized. This absence became, in itself, a meaningful signal.
Another important episode unfolded despite the strict confidentiality surrounding the first meeting in Yerevan. When the Azerbaijani aircraft landed, several media outlets reported the visit, prompting the Armenian side to deploy police explanations clarifying that an Azerbaijani delegation had arrived—though without disclosing names or further details. Later that same day, however, the location of the hotel where we were staying was leaked to the media, most notably by Sputnik Armenia, a Russian state-run outlet. This, too, was a revealing moment.
We could anticipate some form of provocation—or at least a protest—around the hotel. None materialized. This absence became, in itself, a meaningful signal. Despite considerable criticism on social media from both Armenian and Azerbaijani users regarding the visit, no one took to the streets or gathered outside our hotel. We came to interpret this as a form of passive silence—perhaps even tacit acceptance.
Most importantly, as participants, we made a conscious decision to focus on constructive dynamics and shared interests. Differences and divergences undoubtedly remain, but we deliberately sought to identify areas of common ground—elements that could serve as a foundation for meaningful and sustained engagement.
AK: Beyond the powerful symbolism, how do you professionally evaluate the practical outcomes of these forums? What tangible results—if any—have emerged, and what immediate, verifiable steps should civil society leaders take next to capitalize on this momentum?
RH: For us, the most important—and perhaps the most significant—outcomes were the visits and the conversations themselves. Someone had to act as an icebreaker and begin dismantling deeply rooted psychological barriers. All participants, both Armenian and Azerbaijani, came to realize the weight of responsibility resting on our shoulders. We were fully aware of the significance of undertaking these visits and the symbolic and practical implications they carried.
Beyond these foundational steps, there were also tangible outcomes. We agreed on a timeline of several months to implement several concrete and achievable project proposals. We deliberately set aside long-term initiatives that would be overly difficult or unrealistic to realize at this stage. Instead, we chose to focus on projects that were less demanding in terms of human, financial, and time resources. This approach was guided by a shared understanding that progress should be careful and non-provocative—aimed at building trust without unnecessarily irritating public sensitivities on either side.
Fragile is indeed the right word. The process is fragile, and it can only be solidified through the consistency of such engagements. Our interest is to develop these interactions with meaningful content.
AK: Looking ahead, what are the realistic prospects for continued Azerbaijani–Armenian engagement? How sustainable is the fragile civil-society dialogue?
RH: Fragile is indeed the right word. The process is fragile, and it can only be solidified through the consistency of such engagements. Our interest is to develop these interactions with substantive, meaningful content. At the same time, I hope that Armenian–Azerbaijani civil society dialogue initiatives will continue to evolve along parallel tracks. The Peace Bridge initiative, of which I am a part, does not hold a monopoly over communication. Other frameworks, facilitated by third-party mediators, already exist and should continue; new initiatives may also emerge. Ultimately, the goal is to transform this process—gradually but deliberately—from something fragile into something consistent and sustainable.
AK: Before we turn to regional issues, could you briefly introduce yourself and the journey that led you to co-found the Topchubashov Center? In a region where geopolitical narratives are often polarized, what is the core mission of the Center, and what role can independent research institutions play in easing tensions and fostering dialogue in the South Caucasus?
RH: Topchubashov Center is a Baku-based think tank focused on analyzing geopolitical developments primarily in our home region—the South Caucasus—as well as in neighboring regions, including the Middle East, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
In the 2010s, I primarily sustained myself by writing op-eds for various international media outlets. The beginning was difficult: when my name was not yet familiar to editors or think tank communities, I had to work exceptionally hard to gain visibility. Over time, I realized that a friend of mine, with a similar background, had faced the same challenge. This shared experience led us to establish a free online media outlet, Politicon (politicon.co) in 2015—one that would be open to students, recent graduates, and young researchers, allowing them to publish their own analyses and build a public profile.
As we developed this platform, we came to realize that it could eventually evolve into a physical think tank. In 2018, marking the 100th anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, we formally established our center and named it after Ali Mardan bey Topchubashov, one of the founding fathers of the first republic. The branding also reflected a deliberate wordplay: the abbreviated name, Top-Center, carries a positive connotation in English, suggesting excellence and leadership.
Over the past several years, we have significantly increased our visibility. Today, the Topchubashov Center is recognized by both domestic and international stakeholders as a serious institution with a strong cohort of research fellows. Yet we do not stop there. We continuously strive to improve—both individually and collectively—as a center committed to rigorous, policy-relevant research.
I have long believed that the Azerbaijani–Turkish alliance cannot be fully explained through a realist lens alone. It is a fraternal alliance...
AK: The Turkish-Azerbaijani Strategic Alliance: How has the nature of the relationship with Turkey evolved, and how does this strategic alignment influence Azerbaijan's foreign policy maneuvering with Western partners and other regional actors?
RH: According to realist theory, the international system is inherently anarchic: states are natural rivals, and alliances are largely instrumental and temporary. For this reason, I have long believed that the Azerbaijani–Turkish alliance cannot be fully explained through a realist lens alone. It is a fraternal alliance, grounded not merely in strategic calculation but in a shared sense of identity and historical connection.
While the personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries undoubtedly shapes their strategic cooperation, the depth of Azerbaijani–Turkish relations goes far beyond elite politics. Mutual societal perceptions and the enduring ties between the two states’ institutional and security establishments play a crucial role. This is precisely what makes the relationship exceptional.
By contrast, Armenia and Georgia lack an equivalent strategic partner. In our view, this places them in a comparatively more disadvantaged position than Azerbaijan in navigating today’s shifting geopolitical landscape.
From the Azerbaijani perspective, the alliance with Turkey—home to the second-largest army in NATO—is a cornerstone of national security, particularly in an increasingly turbulent international environment where the existing world order is being dismantled and replaced by an uncertain alternative. In this context, Azerbaijan may reasonably feel privileged to enjoy such a robust security umbrella.
By contrast, Azerbaijan’s immediate neighbors, such as Armenia and Georgia, lack an equivalent strategic partner. In our view, this places them in a comparatively more disadvantaged position than Azerbaijan in navigating today’s shifting geopolitical landscape.
AK: The Peace Treaty Process: From your perspective, what are the primary sticking points preventing the finalization of a comprehensive peace treaty with Armenia today? How do you assess the achieved progress, and what is to be expected further? What is the current public“appetite” in Azerbaijan for normalizing life along that long-disputed frontier?
RH: The Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process has produced tangible results, particularly over the past year. Azerbaijan has lifted its de facto embargo on Armenian-bound cargo, begun exporting Azerbaijani petroleum products to Armenia, and recently handed over several Armenian detainees. These steps represent meaningful confidence-building measures.
At present, however, we are living through what I would call a pre-election paradox. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani side is constrained in moving toward full normalization ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 2026. The outcome of these elections remains uncertain, including whether the incumbent government will stay in power or whether new forces—potentially including revanchist political actors—might emerge.
On the other hand, the current Armenian government has invested significant political capital in the peace process with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Any tangible progress on either track would undoubtedly strengthen its electoral position. As a result, elections themselves have become the central bottleneck in the Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process.
Once the elections are over—and assuming Prime Minister Pashinyan and his team remain in power—attention is likely to shift toward constitutional reform in Armenia. From the Azerbaijani perspective, the existing Armenian constitution is seen as the single most significant obstacle to advancing the peace process further.
AK: Azerbaijan is a linchpin in the emerging East-West Middle Corridor transport route. How significant is this corridor to Azerbaijan’s long-term strategic and economic independence, and what are the main hurdles that prevent its full realization?
RH: In recent years, Azerbaijan has invested heavily in connectivity projects, the centerpiece of which is the so-called Middle Corridor. The geopolitical significance of this route has increased substantially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With two major potential transit bridges—Russia and Iran—both under international sanctions, Azerbaijan has emerged as perhaps the most natural and sought-after alternative. In this context, Azerbaijan has effectively become a key bottleneck—and thus a pivotal node—in the Eurasian connectivity map.
Development of the Middle Corridor on the Azerbaijani side is already well underway. As I noted earlier, Azerbaijan has been investing in infrastructure for several years, even before the Middle Corridor gained the prominence it holds today. Nevertheless, a number of challenges remain, which can broadly be divided into soft infrastructure and hard infrastructure issues.
Soft infrastructure challenges relate primarily to the harmonization of customs procedures, tariffs, regulatory frameworks, and digital databases across the countries participating in the Middle Corridor. Hard infrastructure challenges, by contrast, concern the physical construction of highways, railways, and logistics hubs along the route. While Azerbaijan has made substantial progress, the most significant bottleneck at present lies in Central Asia, where critical infrastructure is still insufficient.
That said, work is ongoing, and several pilot shipments and test runs have already been conducted to assess the efficiency and reliability of the Middle Corridor. With continued investment and coordination, there is reason to expect that, in the coming period, the Middle Corridor will be utilized at much greater capacity and emerge as a major artery of Eurasian connectivity.
Contrary to the widely held belief that “Russians never leave,” Azerbaijan demonstrated that it could successfully expel Russian forces from its territory, setting an important precedent...
AK: How do you assess Russia’s current level of influence and relevance in relations with Azerbaijan?
RH: Since its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has pursued an independent foreign policy. Unlike many other post-Soviet states, which aligned themselves firmly along the East–West divide, choosing either a pro-Western or a pro-Russian path, Azerbaijan opted to maintain equities with both geopolitical poles. This approach has defined Baku’s careful and balanced policy toward Russia.
Azerbaijan’s geopolitical leverage over Russia became particularly visible during the 2023 operation in Karabakh, when the Azerbaijani military bypassed the Russian peacekeeping contingent and reasserted control over the remaining parts of Karabakh, previously under Russian supervision. One year later, in 2024, Azerbaijani pressure led to the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. This development, which received relatively little international media attention, marked a significant milestone in post-Soviet history. Contrary to the widely held belief that “Russians never leave,” Azerbaijan demonstrated that it could successfully expel Russian forces from its territory, setting an important precedent for other countries facing Russian military presence, such as Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine.
More recently, Azerbaijani–Russian relations have deteriorated due to the downing of the Asal plane by Russian forces. Baku has formally demanded acknowledgment, an apology, punishment for the perpetrators, and proper compensation. While Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a semi-formal acknowledgment, Russia continues its traditional pattern of downing a civil aircraft without full accountability. Regardless of whether Russia fully complies with these demands, Azerbaijan has emerged as the stronger party in this confrontation. It has maintained its sovereignty, refused to yield to pressure, and preserved a firm stance, reinforcing its independent foreign policy posture.
AK: Relations between Baku and Tehran have been complex - what is your assessment of the current state of play?
RH: Azerbaijani–Iranian relations have always been complex, despite shared historical ties and religious commonalities. The situation worsened after the Second Karabakh War, driven in part by Iran’s ambiguous stance on Azerbaijan’s new geopolitical position, the growing Azerbaijani–Turkish tandem, and Israel’s military support to Azerbaijan, which Tehran viewed as contrary to its national interests in the South Caucasus.
At the same time, Azerbaijan responded firmly and did not retreat from its positions. A thaw in bilateral relations became noticeable following the election of Masoud Pezeshkian, an ethnic Azerbaijani, as president of the Islamic Republic.
Currently, Azerbaijan’s primary concern lies with domestic developments in Iran and Tehran’s broader regional relations, particularly its potential conflicts with Israel or the United States. Any spillover from instability in Iran—whether a civil conflict or a war with external actors—could generate a range of undesirable scenarios for Azerbaijan, making careful monitoring and contingency planning essential.
AK: What are the most constructive roles the European Union and the United States can play in supporting long-term peace and security in the South Caucasus, versus actions that are perceived as counterproductive or interfering?
RH: Given the current dynamics between the EU and Russia, the EU and the United States, and the United States and Russia, it is increasingly challenging to assess the constructive role these actors can play in the South Caucasus, particularly in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. On one hand, U.S. involvement in TRIPP—the transport and infrastructure project that is a key element of the Zangazur corridor—provides Azerbaijan with critical access to Nakhchivan and, further, to Turkey [read more on TRIPP here - CJ]
On the other hand, the EU is also seeking a more active role in the region. It has already made significant investments in Armenia and is now looking to participate in broader connectivity projects. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, however, EU engagement should prioritize concrete infrastructure initiatives, such as the reconstruction of the Nakhchivan rail network and rebuilding efforts in Karabakh. After years of occupation and devastation, Karabakh requires substantial support for demining, reconstruction, and resettlement to restore stability and facilitate sustainable development.
AK: The Next Decade: Looking ten years ahead, what is the most plausible—and the most desirable—political and economic configuration for the South Caucasus region? What needs to happen today to realize that better future?
RH: Making forecasts is extremely challenging, especially as the global order—and the regional order we once knew—is undergoing profound change. Nonetheless, at Topchubashov Center, and personally in my work, we have been advocating for what we call the South Caucasus Trio—a regional platform for comprehensive cooperation and the development of joint mechanisms among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
By fostering a shared regional identity and coordinated responses to external turbulences, all three countries could significantly enhance regional resilience. At the same time, they could harmonize or align their foreign policies toward external actors and emerging challenges.
We already have a precedent in the 3+3 initiative, proposed after the Second Karabakh War, though it was implemented incompletely due to Georgia’s absence. Establishing a functional core South Caucasus Trio, however, would be highly beneficial. Once this core is in place, various formulas could be explored—SC3+3, SC+1 vis-à-vis the EU or the U.S., SC+5 vis-à-vis Central Asia, and so on—allowing the region to engage flexibly and strategically with different external partners.
AK: That's very interesting; similar ideas have been discussed during the Caucasian Journal's recent webinar with experts from Georgia and Visegrad Four countries.
Thank you very much for your excellent answers! You are always welcome here.
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