08.04.2026 (Caucasian Journal). In this fourth and final installment of our webinar series, "Visegrad Lessons for Georgia," we move beyond theoretical analysis toward a practical synthesis.
This roundtable brought together a diverse panel of experts from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Georgia to discuss how regional cooperation can be insulated from the turbulence of high-level politics.
▶ ქართულად: The Georgian version is here.
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Action points for Georgia include implementing the model of “compartmentalization”—the deliberate separation of necessary practical cooperation from high-level political conflict—by focusing on maintaining functional relationships in mutually beneficial sectors, regardless of the political climate.
The proceedings of our previous webinars have been published in English and Georgian at: Webinar 1, Webinar 2, Webinar 3.
The full text version of Webinar 4 is below:
LESSONS FOR GEORGIA: ROUNDTABLE AND ACTION POINTS
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the fourth and final webinar in our series Visegrad Lessons for Georgia. We are very grateful to the International Visegrad Fund for supporting this initiative.
Over the course of our webinars, we have examined how the Visegrad Group has managed to preserve cooperation despite political disagreements. In our first discussion, we focused on the structural and institutional foundations of this resilience. In the second and third webinars, we explored how this unity functions in specific sectors from science and environmental cooperation to business and economic ties.
Today, we move from analysis to synthesis and hopefully to action. The key question for this final roundtable is not only what worked in the Visegrad case, but what can realistically work in Georgia's context. Georgia faces a different institutional environment, but similar risks, deepening political polarization, and growing uncertainty affecting long-term planning.
Can cooperation beyond politics be sustained in such conditions? What concrete steps can be taken? With that, let me turn to the first question. Over the course of our discussions, we have identified mechanisms that allow the Visegrad group to sustain cooperation. Can we identify a core principle across political, scientific, and economic cooperation that keeps these relationships functional even in times of tension?
Importantly, I would welcome your opinions on whether the Visegrad 4 model, or rather its elements, can be used elsewhere, and in our region, in particular. Pavel, please.
Pavel HAVLICEK: I work for a Prague-based think tank Association for International Affairs. What really helps us in Central Europe to keep cooperation despite difficult times, sometimes politically on different levels, is the level of pragmatism and realization that we are all interested in maintaining good neighborly relations.
I remember that four or five years ago, actually at the high-level government level, there was a very tense situation in between Czechia and Poland regarding some of the mining in the border regions. But again, I think it was really through the civil society engagement at different levels that really helped to overcome. Nowadays, similarly, the relationship between some of the countries of the region changes over time, and we can see that in the relations between Poland and Hungary.
I think this is very genuine, and it overcomes these political turbulences that just come and go, but the personal relations are here to stay. I think this is one of the features that we can recommend from the region of Central Europe. And that has worked rather well over the last 30-35 years since the fall of communism.
Magda JAKUBOWSKA: I'm Magda Jakubowska of Visegrad Insight and Res Publika Foundation. It's not my first time in these seminars, and I really enjoyed it. I want to reiterate what Pavel Havlicek has said. We cooperate very often, and it is true that the V4 model of cooperation is building the network with ties on the people-to-people level, but the economic and entrepreneurial cooperation is also very important. These B2B and B2G relationships are also very useful within the V4 cooperation. Our economies are quite dependent on each other.
We have common suppliers, common exports, cooperation with Germany, France, etc. And therefore, even in a small-scale business, these ties are very developed and needed on an everyday basis. In many aspects, the capacities of the Visegrad Fund, where smaller enterprises, SMEs, and social enterprises are welcomed to work together, also give a platform of cooperation when political challenges are behind us.
Gabor TURY: I'm from the Institute of World Economics. The political situation is very turbulent at that time - especially in Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and also in Poland. So there are ruling parties from the left and the right side. But above this issue, we should create common values and goals, the common agricultural policy, and the common interest in the EU issues. But it's very hard.
On the other hand, many Hungarian companies buy Czech companies and Czech companies buy Hungarian companies. This cooperation is very good for our economic level. And also, Visegrad cooperation is very important, so we can meet and discuss our problems. If you are in a public administration or in relations with public administration, they can use our ideas and results.
Łukasz OGRODNIK: Łukasz Ogrodnik, Polish Institute of International Affairs. I work for the European Program at PISM, which is a public Polish think tank. Thank you for inviting me. As there is no political glue within the V4, we know the circumstances of the current crisis within the Visegrad group. But there were times when Visegrad countries were backing Eastern Partnership countries, including Georgia. There were several statements in 2021, for instance, V4 as a platform of regional cooperation backing the steps of countries like Georgia towards the European Union. It's not the case anymore.
However, the current Visegrad cooperation relies on institutions like the International Visegrad Fund mentioned by Magdalena Jakubowska. And IVF is financing a tool called Civil Servant Mobility Program, CSMP, which is co-organized by think tanks within the Visegrad platform. And the aim is to organize study trips for public servants from countries like Georgia, Eastern Partnership countries and Western Balkan countries, and to share experience on different levels and on different thematic fields. The public statistics on the website tell that since 2014, 540 public servants from these countries made a study trip to V4 countries. And among them, there were 28 civil servants from Georgia.
So thanks to IVF, which last year celebrated 25 years of its existence, and which has, as far as I know, the budget of roughly 11 billion euros from last year to such projects like sharing experience with Georgians. And despite political circumstances and crises with it, the V4 can be possible. Thank you.
AK: Thank you very much, Lukasz. I think you have brought a very useful practical point.
It's very important to speak with the people who vote for the right parties, because in many cases, these people are not extremist and far-right supporters. These people are often confused because they are very angry with the system.
Andrzej BAN: Hello, my name is Andrzej Ban. I am a journalist for 40 years and also an activist from Slovakia. I was in Georgia in 2008 during the war with Russia. I want to join my experience as a civic activist with people who vote for the far right and extremist parties, which is, I guess, the problem in Slovakia, in Hungary, and in Czechia too. I want to suggest something.
It's very important to speak with the people who vote for the right parties, because in many cases, these people are not extremist and far-right supporters. These people are often confused because they are very angry with the system. And it's important, I think, also in your country, in Georgia, to make the discussions in the forgotten regions of Georgia with the people who are living there, because they don't know any one politician personally.
They don't know any civic activists personally. And my experience is years of these discussions - we had discussions with more than 10,000 people in Slovakia. So my experience is that it's very important to speak personally, directly with these people, not through the Internet, not through online platforms, not through social media, but personally.
AK: Thank you very much. I think this is a very important suggestion, and I absolutely agree with this personally. Marzenna, please.
Marzenna GUZ-VETTER: I'm a senior fellow at Visegrad Insight. I would like to share some remarks about how this Visegrad cooperation has functioned in the past. Since all these countries joined the EU, at this time, there were proposals by politicians and by regional activists to strengthen, with help of EU funds, the region, also in terms of transport networks.
But this has not taken place. We have lost a lot of time when conditions for political cooperation were better than now. We did not have a regional strategy for the Visegrad region to improve road connections and train connections, and also to improve economic cooperation. In fact, this group, this Visegrad region, does not exist in the European debate as a special force or entity.
There were also no Visegrad recommendations for any EU reforms. And we lost a lot of time when the political situation was much better, because now we have de facto in Slovakia, Czechia, and especially in Hungary, very anti-European and nationalist governments. In Poland, we still have a pro-EU, pro-democratic government, but we have a president who is absolutely from the opposite side of the political spectrum. He is very Eurosceptic, and he is very nationalist.
We can hope that Orbán will not win the elections. If he loses the elections, this would be a very big chance for the revival of the Visegrad Group.
And especially Hungary, because of Orban, is presented in the media and in the public in Poland as the key traitor of the EU. So on a political level, at the moment, I do not see any possibilities to strengthen the cooperation between the Visegrad countries. So what can we do? Of course, we can hope that Orban will not win the elections. If he loses the elections, this would be a very big chance for the revival of the Visegrad Group.
And there should also be preparations for this - contacts with TISZA [Hungary’s opposition party - CJ]. And when there is a political change in Hungary, this must be used to strengthen the cooperation within the Visegrad countries. And as the situation is as it is, the only possibilities are in strengthening civil society cooperation, media cooperation, and economic relations. This already happens.
My experience from meetings with Visegrad’s civil society representatives was always very positive. We feel that we have a lot in common, especially the experience of the communist times.
In my opinion, what we could do is maybe to have more pressure on media - if this is possible to have it. I do not know how it is in your countries, but in Poland, there is not much news about what is going on in the Visegrad countries - except for Hungary, of course, because of Orban. All the other initiatives, people-to-people, regional initiatives, the common tasks of civil society, and disinformation problems, could be much more highlighted.
Over the last couple of years, Visegrad countries have not really been that visible. And if they are visible, they are visible not in the best way. They have earned the name of a troublemaker.
But until there is political will on the side of the Visegrad Four leaders to strengthen the cooperation and to present more visibility, what is our answer to the debates on the future of Europe? What's our answer and position on the energy and the ETS (Emissions Trading System)? This was in the past, because there were five V4 meetings before the European Council, but they are not there. So this is a big problem that we do not express our regional interests towards other EU states, as countries that have only since 1989 joined the market economy and democracy.
Matúš MIŠÍK: I work at the Comenius University of Bratislava. Thank you for inviting me. This is my first meeting. Thank you very much for doing this. Because frankly, I really believe that Visegrad needs something like this.
We haven't heard much from Visegrad recently because I believe that Visegrad is sort of falling apart. Of course, I'm talking about the political level. At the regional, local, or people's level, I hope things are better. But over the last couple of years, the Visegrad Group or Visegrad countries have not really been that visible. And if they are visible, they are visible not in the best way. They have earned the name of a troublemaker.
And most of the time, when they have cooperated over the last couple of years, it was when they were trying to pursue or create a bigger opposition to some common EU goals. And this wasn't always that all member states, all Visegrad member states, wanted to do this. Sometimes we saw some countries, especially Hungary, try to find or develop a coalition from Visegrad for countries to create some kind of a critical mass against the Commission, against the EU.
Recently, Orbán succeeded in cooperating with the Slovak Fico’s government. But Visegrad 4 is not the same thing as it used to be during the 90s. And during the 90s and early 2000s, it was very active, mostly because most of the countries wanted it to be active. They had this common goal of getting into the EU and they were supporting each other on the path. They were supporting Slovakia, especially because Slovakia was the black sheep of the whole region. But once the Visegrad groups made it into the EU, they had a hard time finding what they wanted to really do together.
And then during the pandemic years, it kind of faded away, and they even stopped publishing documents a couple of years ago. I haven't checked for a couple of months, but when I did last time, there were no new documents. So the cooperation, I'm not sure whether this is actually a good blueprint for other regional cooperation. Maybe the Visegrad group can provide lessons on how not to do things, rather than how to do them.
Maybe this is not the best platform to be so critical of Visegrad cooperation, but I really hope that at the different levels, the cooperation works better. But for me, when I look at the political level, it really looks like the only time Visegrad group has been cooperating over the last couple of years is when somebody tried to create a bigger group of member states who would be critical towards the Commission, actually, or the president of the Commission. So this was sometimes very personal, from where I'm standing. And I'm not sure whether this is a good base for any kind of cooperation. Thank you.
Pavel HAVLICEK: Very briefly to react to Matus and also to what was mentioned by Marzenna, I think we need to realize who we are talking to - to colleagues from Georgia. So if there is one region that is on fire these days, this is the region of the South Caucasus, so I think you, colleagues, have the best experience in really having not always easy relations among each other.
So in that sense, despite all odds, and I definitely agree with you, Matus, the Central European region looks like an oasis of calmness in comparison with the South Caucasus. In that sense, I think the good practice can still be brought here. But I definitely agree with another thing that was mentioned by you, Matus, and this is that there are no clear answers to what we are facing these days.
And while I was also following carefully what Marzena was mentioning, I think that with the fall of the Orbán regime, this will not end. This is not a magical thing that will bring us all together. Unfortunately, what's happening now in Czechia, but also for quite a while in Slovakia, they're just illustrating that the countries really have not only different interests, but there's a lot of illiberal tendencies still prevailing, and this will survive the potential fall of the Orbán regime.
So my question to all of us is, actually, what are the solutions? Okay, we will have TISZA, we'll have better Magyar, but will it become easy? No, unfortunately. So we will need to continue investing in the things that we mentioned earlier. Magda mentioned some of those additionally to my points.
But I think still, despite all odds, I think it's worth sharing with colleagues in Georgia, which is itself having really a lot of problems. Actually, it's more and more isolated. I don't like to see it.
We really tried to do our best to help integrate the country into the EU. But now the trajectory is completely opposite, unfortunately. But speaking about the neighbor relations, I think it's very important to keep the channels open to discussion, to have these coordination platforms. Despite difficult situations, really, we exchange on our interests where we stand and what we can do together.
And the level of pragmatism, and I would like to come back to it, is a really important one, because, despite Orbán not being there, and I have my fingers crossed for that, it will not be easy also in the “Magyar years” to come after that.
The main lesson for Georgia from Visegrad is not the political unity, but the ability to cooperate despite political differences...What cooperation requires are mechanisms that function even when politics is polarized.
David DONDUA: I'm a former Georgian diplomat, currently an international diplomat residing in Vienna, representing the European public law organization and international organizations here in Austria, and chair of the EU Awareness Center, a Brussels-based think tank dedicated to promoting European values.
What I would like to say, stemming from our three previous webinar discussions and from my previous experience working with colleagues from Visegrad, the main lessons for Georgia from Visegrad are not the political unity, but the ability to cooperate despite political differences. The Visegrad countries often disagree on major political issues, including relations with Russia, EU policies, migration, rule of law questions, but yet cooperation continues in many areas, because you have learned how to separate political conflicts from practical cooperation.
The key principle, therefore, is “compartmentalization”, so political disagreements do not stop cooperation in the areas where it is mutually beneficial. For Georgia, it's a very important lesson, because our problem is not just a political disagreement per se (disagreements exist in all democracies), the problem is that political disagreements often - or always - are blocking cooperation in almost all sectors. So the main lesson for Georgia is that cooperation does not require political unity. What cooperation requires are mechanisms that function even when politics is polarized.
If we still have time, a few words about what kind of experience we can transfer from Visegrad to Georgia. What I see as transferable areas for Georgia:
- Cooperation between research institutions, which I represent now, and also universities. Although with the current education reform in Georgia, even this might be a problem.
- Business cooperation that continues in most cases, regardless of politics, not only in our region, but worldwide.
- Expert networks and think-tank cooperation in other areas.
- Also, sectoral cooperation in areas like energy, transport, and education, as I have already mentioned, and informal regional formats and regular meetings.
Therefore, Georgia cannot copy the Visegrad model as a whole, but it can adapt to the logic of cooperation.
What I don't see as realistic and not easily transferable is the EU framework, which provides funding and legal stability. For Georgia, it won't be available for a long period, unfortunately.
What we also lack is a pre-accession EU consensus, which all the Visegrad countries had about the EU and NATO membership. And last but not least, the strong institutional stability that, in the V4 case, existed before polarization intensified.
Therefore, Georgia cannot copy the Visegrad model as a whole, but it can adapt to the logic of cooperation.
Magda JAKUBOWSKA: I'll try to be very clear. We had this moment where we mentioned values and common values during this conversation.
It is important to say that we don't develop those values: those values are there. And this is what we have. Maybe not with every government or not with every leader in V4, but we still aim to stick to the values that have already been there, created, and the code is there with the European Union. I think that it is very important that we stick to that.
And there is this guidance, this path that we aim to. Although the challenges are there, as we already mentioned a number of times, something that connects the Visegrad countries was the aim of getting to the EU, being on the same side of every question of the rule of law, human rights, and so on. And this is what we have to continue and aim to, even if we divert it from the path, any of the countries, any of the leaders. This is something that I see as important in that case.
Pavel HAVLICEK: I just wanted to go back to what Dato mentioned. I think this was really interesting to compare and contrast the regional component in our cooperation.
Sometimes the desired goal is not to create a political unity. Sometimes it's just impossible... It's more important to dissect those two and to focus on what can actually be achieved, and where the neighbor relations are actually useful for everybody, where this is a win-win situation.
Of course, we also understand that it is much more difficult for the South Caucasian countries to follow the same track. In modern history or in recent decades, we were not in such a difficult situation as some of the countries of the region are now. We haven't had wars with each other. We were not killing each other as Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
Now, with the Georgia government, which many people are characterizing as a pro-Russian government, including myself, it's a very difficult landscape.
But what I think Dato was describing very rightly is that sometimes the desired goal is not to create a political unity. Sometimes it's just impossible. And I think we are still in this situation - maybe also in Central Europe - but definitely in the South Caucasus. It's more important to dissect those two and to focus on what can actually be achieved, and where the neighbor relations are actually useful for everybody, where this is a win-win situation.
And in that regard, this is actually a useful logic that Dato introduced. And I very much subscribe to this because when I was speaking about this pragmatism, it was essentially trying to capture that. And I think you very rightly described the areas such as education, people-to-people ties, transport, it's often mentioned in that regard, where everybody benefits when there is cooperation.
And to look for these kinds of issues might be the topic for the next fifth seminar, potentially. So these are definitely interesting areas where we can focus and do more things together. Thank you.
David DONDUA: What Georgia could do in practical terms. I just now briefly put down three possible steps that can be done in the current situation. Honestly, it's not that I really believe that it is doable, but let's say it's my wishful thinking on what can be done if there is a political will from the side of the government and from the side of the opposition as well.
So what are the realistic steps that we can propose? On most of these topics, we had special webinars previously, and these ideas came to me by looking back at our discussions.
- First is to create a platform for sectoral cooperation where government, opposition, experts, businesses, and academia can collaborate on specific sectors that they think are important in any case, whatever the political situation, which are, first and foremost, energy security, the economy, environment, and education.
- Second is to develop a cross-party agreement on strategic sectors in which all major political actors agree not to politicize certain areas. Again, say, energy security, infrastructure, connectivity, and EU integration (but I'm not sure about the last one).
- And third is to focus on small and practical cooperation projects that more easily produce visible results. As we diplomats know, trust is often built not through political dialogue, but through successful, tangible joint projects. Therefore, trust is usually not a starting point, but it is a result of cooperation. Thank you.
On most of these topics, we had special webinars previously, and these ideas came to me by looking back at our discussions.
Trust is often built not through political dialogue, but through successful, tangible joint projects. Therefore, trust is usually not a starting point, but it is a result of cooperation.
AK: Thank you very much, Dato. Thank you very much for your participation. I think we have done a very useful work.
About the participants:
• Andrej BAN, Documentary photographer, journalist
• Khatia BUKHRASHVILI, Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce - ICC Georgia
• David DONDUA, Former Georgian Ambassador to NATO, OSCE, Greece, Serbia, Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, EPLO Permanent Representative to IACA, Chairman of the Board at the EU Awareness Centre
• Kinga GAJDA, Associate Professor, Head of the Institute of European Studies, Chair of Society and Cultural Heritage of Europe; Faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University
• Marzenna GUZ-VETTER, Independent expert and journalist; former Director of the European Commission Representation in Poland; member of Team EUROPE DIRECT expert network
• Pavel HAVLICEK, Research Fellow at the Research Centre, Association for International Affairs (AMO)
• Vít HLOUŠEK, Professor of Political Science, Metropolitan University, Prague
• Magda JAKUBOWSKA, Vice President and Director of Operations, the Res Publica Foundation
• Murman MARGVELASHVILI, Director, World Experience for Georgia, Professor and Director, Energy and Sustainability Institute, Ilia State University
• Juraj MARUSIAK, Institute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Matúš MIŠÍK, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Comenius University
• Łukasz OGRODNIK, Analyst, The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
• Dóra PIROSKA, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Central European University
• Magda PRZEDMOJSKA, Director of Operations, Visegrad Insight
• Oszkár ROGINER-HOFMEISTER, Head of the Global Europe Programme, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
• Nikoloz SHURGAIA, Management consultant; Chairman, Sadagi; former CEO, PASHA Bank Georgia
• Marta SIMECKOVA, Chairwoman, Project Forum (Občianske združenie Projekt Fórum), founder, Amnesty International Slovakia
• Martin SKALSKÝ, Chairman, NGO Arnika, head of Center for Citizen Support programme
• Arslan SULEYMANOV, Assistant Editor at Visegrad Insight
• Gábor TÚRY, Senior Researcher, ELTE CERS, Institute of World Economics
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